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Peter B. Kenen 
My comments will  focus mainly on crisis prevention and crisis manage- 
ment, but I will start with brief remarks on the causes and characteristics 
of the Asian crisis. 
In chapter 4  of this volume, Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  Sachs identify 
five types of financial crises-a  rubric under which they implicitly sub- 
sume what we usually describe as currency crises. While financial and cur- 
rency crises go together frequently, it is still useful to distinguish between 
them. The European Monetary System crisis of  1992-93 was a currency 
crisis. The savings and loan crisis in  the United  States was  a financial 
crisis, although limited to a subsector of the financial system. It is still 
useful, moreover, to distinguish between crises due to weak fundamentals, 
including  microeconomic  fundamentals,  and  self-fulfilling crises  that 
would not occur if market participants did not expect them. 
I  insist on the relevance of  these distinctions, not for the purpose of 
arguing that the Asian crisis can be stuffed into one analytical box, but 
because that  crisis can  best be  understood  by  drawing on several ap- 
proaches. 
The Thai crisis that touched off the general crisis can be blamed mainly 
on bad fundamentals. On the microeconomic side, inadequate prudential 
supervision allowed financial institutions to take on huge amounts of for- 
eign currency debt and offset it by  foreign currency lending to local bor- 
rowers having no foreign currency revenues. On the macroeconomic side, 
the current account deficit was large and growing, due to the Thai govern- 
ment’s stubborn defense of an overvalued currency and to falling export 
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growth,  reflecting  excessive East  Asian  investment  in  a  rather  narrow 
range of export industries. In short, Thailand was an accident waiting to 
happen, and that was widely recognized long before the crisis. The Tnter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) warned the Thai authorities repeatedly 
that they were courting disaster. 
But were the other Asian countries accidents waiting to happen? Many 
people say so now. The involvement of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea 
has shown, they say, that the so-called Asian model was doomed to failure 
or had at least been rendered obsolete by  its initial success. Absent the 
Thai crisis, however, would the stock markets and currencies of Indonesia 
and Korea have collapsed as they did? Some firms and banks were in 
trouble, serious enough perhaps to trigger a full-fledged crisis. But I am 
far from sure. Indonesia and Korea might have found “Asian solutions” 
to the problems of those firms and banks-solutions  that would not sat- 
isfy us now but might well have earned admiration from some of the same 
people  who  now  ascribe  those problems  to  the  fatal weakness of  the 
Asian model. 
Be  that as it may,  we  should be quite cautious about recommending 
remedies to the Asian countries-the  further,  rapid liberalization of fi- 
nancial markets and the dismantling of long-standing links among banks, 
businesses, and bureaucrats. Greater transparency is needed to deter cor- 
ruption and promote a sounder credit culture. But we  will  deceive our- 
selves and the Asian countries if  we  claim that these objectives can be 
achieved quickly, even when governments have agreed in good  faith to 
undertake major reforms. Old habits cannot be altered rapidly. They will 
merely find new ways to manifest themselves. 
I am intrigued by another aspect of the Asian crisis-the  speed with 
which a so-called liquidity crisis can turn into a solvency crisis when it 
leads to a steep depreciation of the domestic currency. Whenever banks 
and firms have large foreign currency debts, they will scramble for cover 
when they begin to believe that their national currency might depreciate. 
That is what happened in Asia as soon as the depreciation of the baht 
raised doubts about other Asian exchange rates, and the problem was ex- 
acerbated by the sharp fall in stock markets. There was  indeed a perni- 
cious interaction between stock markets and currency markets.  Falling 
stock markets led to large foreign sales of equities (see table 4.2 in chap. 
4). These sales were then reflected in sales of the domestic currency, de- 
pressing its value and provoking additional sales of equities. The numbers 
suggest, moreover, that local banks and firms contributed to the process, 
as they sought-or  were forced-to  repay their foreign currency debts. 
This cumulative process, however, made it increasingly expensive for 
banks and firms to service or repay the rest of their foreign currency debts, 
and those that were solvent at the exchange rates prevailing before the 
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however, if Asian currencies recover significantly, which leads me to ask 
whether there has been too much talk of the need for permanent  debt 
workouts  as distinct  from  short-term  suspensions of  debt  service pay- 
ments. 
This comment leads me directly to my main point. There may be better 
ways to deal with financial crises. 
At the Halifax summit in 1995, the G-10 countries were asked to estab- 
lish a working group to study new ways to resolve sovereign liquidity cri- 
ses. Jeffrey Sachs can take partial credit. He proposed a radical solution- 
a bankruptcy  regime for sovereign debtors-although,  in the end, the 
working group rejected his approach. Its recommendations were more like 
those of Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes (see Sachs 1995; Eichen- 
green and Portes 1995; Group of Ten 1996). 
The working group’s views can be summed up in two sentences: The 
response to the Mexican crisis of 1994-95,  massive financial assistance to 
avoid  a default on the Tesobonos, was  appropriate  under  the circum- 
stances. Hereafter,  however,  debtor governments  and  private  creditors 
should not expect that response. 
What might be done instead? When a government cannot service its 
external debt, it should suspend its debt service payments temporarily and 
initiate negotiations  with its private creditors in order to reschedule or 
reduce its debt. It should not be refused ordinary access to IMF credit if 
it adopts appropriate policies and is making a good faith effort to reach 
agreement with its private creditors. In other words, the IMF should “lend 
into arrears” when doing so would signal confidence in the debtor’s poli- 
cies and its  long-term prospects.  Finally,  new  foreign currency  bonds 
should include certain clauses aimed at facilitating negotiations between 
a debtor government and its private creditors when debt service payments 
have been interrupted. These proposals were endorsed by the G-10 gov- 
ernments. 
Although the working group’s report was concerned chiefly with Mexi- 
co’s problem-the  inability of a national government to honor its own 
obligations-the  group knew that the next crisis might well involve private 
sector debt. In fact, some of its members were already worried about Thai- 
land, and the report contained two paragraphs that are directly relevant 
to the Asian crisis: 
On the question of the spectrum of claims to be covered, a suspension 
of payments will in general be applied uniformly to all claims in a partic- 
ular class but will differ in scope depending on the severity of the liquid- 
ity problem, the composition of the country’s obligations, the prospec- 
tive contribution  of  a  particular  creditor  class to the  restoration  of 
balance-of-payments equilibrium and other considerations. . . . It may 
no longer be possible to exempt bonds and other claims because of their 
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its, taking account of the fact that trade credits and interbank lines are 
crucial for  maintaining  links with  the world  economy.  (Group of  Ten 
1996, par. 86; emphasis in original) 
It must also be recognized that if the suspension of payments is ex- 
tended to obligations of the private sector, this may require the use of 
formal or informal exchange controls. However, the resort to such con- 
trols, even temporarily, can have long-lasting adverse effects on a coun- 
try’s access to international capital markets and may not be practicable 
once a country has completely liberalized external payments and dis- 
mantled the machinery for imposing controls. Debtors may nonetheless 
be tempted to resort to such controls to slow a “rush for the exit” by 
holders of claims, including domestic holders, which have to believe that 
a suspension of payments can occur soon. In the case of marketable 
claims, however, sales may be discouraged by sharp falls in prices caused 
by the expectation that controls will be imposed; this effect can be re- 
inforced by a depreciation of the domestic currency. When appropriate, 
a degree of exchange-rate flexibility could help to conserve the country’s 
remaining foreign exchange reserves and may even obviate the need to 
obstruct the servicing of the private sector’s obligations. (par. 88) 
The predictions made about falling asset prices and depreciating curren- 
cies were not borne out in  Asia; far from deterring the exit of foreign 
capital, they may have intensified the capital outflow. Nevertheless, some 
of the sentences in these two paragraphs help to explain why the working 
group’s approach was not adopted in  the Asian crisis-why  it was not 
decided to impose a prompt, comprehensive ban on debt service payments 
by  the private  sector  rather  than provide increasingly big packages  of 
official credit. 
It might have been very hard to make the Thai government adopt the 
working group’s approach and imprudent to count on strict enforcement. 
The Thais were in denial until they ran out of reserves. At that early stage 
in the crisis, moreover, the risk of exchange rate contagion was underesti- 
mated, and a suspension of debt service payments may have been viewed 
as being more dangerous to neighboring countries than a large devalua- 
tion of the Thai baht. But the objections listed in the G-10 report-the 
need to protect trade credits and interbank lines and the adverse effects 
on future creditworthiness-may  have been the main objections to a sus- 
pension of debt service payments. The approach actually adopted, how- 
ever, has had very grave effects of its own-not  on the Asian countries 
themselves, but on future funding for the IMF. 
Those who believe that the IMF should be abolished because it inter- 
feres with the workings of free markets would have been even more vocif- 
erous if the IMF had endorsed or required a suspension of debt service 
payments. Those who believe that the IMF should give more attention to 
the environment, labor standards, and human rights would not have been 
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But the IMF  has also been criticized for helping to hold open the exit by 
providing large-scale financing and thus helping foreign banks and others 
having foreign currency claims to leave without taking large losses. Some 
suffered very large losses on their loans to nonbank borrowers, especially 
in Indonesia, but others exited early enough to avoid large losses, and the 
banks that agreed to roll over their loans to Korean banks will not take 
large losses either. They could not obtain the big interest rate spreads on 
which they insisted initially, but their claims were guaranteed by the Ko- 
rean government. 
Bearing in mind the concerns expressed in the G-10 report itself-the 
need to keep trade credit flowing and maintain interbank lines and the 
concern about creditworthiness-let  me propose amendments to the strat- 
egy described in the G-10 report. The fundamental premise is, I believe, 
unassailable. If a country with large foreign currency debts, whether those 
of the government or the private sector, faces an acute liquidity crisis, a 
comprehensive suspension of debt service payments may be superior to 
the mobilization of massive financial assistance. The latter tends to reward 
those who were doubly dumb-who  lent too much initially and were not 
nimble enough to rush for the exit quickly. 
Trade credit flows must not be cut off, and that aim can be achieved by 
the method now being devised for the Asian countries-concerted  action 
by the export credit agencies of the country’s chief trade partners to under- 
write or supplement private sector credit flows, with IMF credit used per- 
haps to back up that effort. Interbank lines must be maintained but should 
be limited in advance. An emerging market country that is not ready to 
exercise rigorous prudential supervision of its own banks should be ex- 
pected to impose strict ceilings on the gross foreign currency debts of its 
banks-gross,  not net, to rule out the ridiculous practice of offsetting debt 
to foreign banks by  making foreign currency loans to domestic entities. 
(Banks might be allowed to offset foreign currency debt with claims on 
foreign counterparties, such as forward contracts, but  not with foreign 
currency claims on their own offshore affiliates.) How could such limits be 
enforced? By  amending the Basle capital adequacy standard. Loans to 
banks in countries that fail to meet well-defined international standards 
for bank supervision and do not impose strict limits on their banks’ for- 
eign currency debts should be given high risk weightings. 
Many problems would have to be solved to implement this scheme. It 
would require the creation of a new international agency or a new division 
in the IMF to assess the quality of bank supervision in emerging market 
countries. But that would be easier than trying to create a single suprana- 
tional regulator for those countries’ banks. The scheme would have the 
effect of limiting the size of interbank lines and thus limiting the moral 
hazard effect of exempting those interbank lines from a suspension of debt 
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One more observation to avoid misunderstanding. I am not proposing 
that the suspension of debt service payments be followed by a comprehen- 
sive negotiation between private sector debtors and their foreign creditors. 
When it comes time to end the suspension of debt service payments, some 
private sector debtors will be able to meet their obligations, including ar- 
rears accumulated during the suspension, without great difficulty. Much 
will depend, of course, on the level of  their country’s exchange rate when 
the suspension is ended. Other private sector debtors will have much more 
trouble and will have then to negotiate with their creditors or enter into 
bankruptcy. Which leads me to my last suggestion. Credit-rating agencies 
should be strongly encouraged to examine the bankruptcy laws and prac- 
tices of emerging market countries when they rate corporate borrowers. It 
is not enough to assess the risk of  default. It is also necessary to assess 
the consequences. 
I have not tried to supply an agenda for full-fledged reform of the inter- 
national financial system. Much more must  be done. There is need to 
amend the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination  Standard to require that 
countries supply timely data on the foreign currency debts and claims of 
commercial banks and the rest of the private sector. There is need to take 
a fresh look at ways in which the IMF might punish member governments 
for failing to heed confidential advice on their exchange rate policies. And 
there is an obvious need to work long and hard on strengthening bank 
supervision  in emerging market countries.  My chief aim in these brief 
comments has been to revive and revise the main proposal in the G-10 
report-to  find an acceptable way of replacing massive financial support 
with short-term suspensions of debt service payments. 
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